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Abstract 
The inclusion of subnational parliaments into the Early Warning System for subsidiarity control has 
generated transforming dynamics in the parliamentary modus operandi in EU decentralized systems. 
The empirical findings reveal considerable variations in the pace and scope of subnational 
parliamentary activity in ex-ante EU policy control challenging the existing theories of subnational 
mobilization. This article sheds light on these variations drawing from a comparative institutional 
analysis. It offers a theoretical framework which permits to account for the differences in the patterns 
of subnational parliamentary mobilization in the framework of the EWS, and beyond. This paper 
claims that the two most important variables behind the scope and effectiveness of regional 
parliamentary activity are the meso-level factors of the relationship between executive and legislature 
at subnational level and the position of regional executives in domestic governance arrangements. 
Keywords 
Subnational parliaments, Early Warning System, Europeanization. 
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Introduction 
The new provisions for parliamentary engagement in the European Union’s (hereafter EU) policy-
making enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty have spurred the academic debate about the (re-) 
parliamentarization of the EU governance structure. The engagement of national parliaments in the 
control of subsidiarity as well as the dynamics of inter-parliamentary relations in the field of European 
affairs have recently received significant scholarly attention (Cooper 2012; Kiiver 2012; Kaczyński 
2011; Matarazzo and Leone 2011; Raunio 2010; Louis 2008). Some authors have even proclaimed the 
emergence of a ‘virtual third chamber’ collectively fulfilling the legislative, representative and 
deliberative function in the EU (Cooper 2012). However, in the discussion about the nature of 
parliamentary control in the EU not much has been said about the role of subnational legislative 
chambers in the post-Lisbon institutional context. Moreover, the existing theoretical framework for 
studying parliamentary representation in the EU seems to overlook the subnational dimension. In their 
conceptualization of a ‘multilevel parliamentary field’, Crum and Fossum (2009) de facto limit their 
analysis to two-level relations between the European Parliament and the national chambers. This paper 
builds on a premise that if the input legitimacy of the EU is to be comprehensively evaluated, the 
analysis should also include the subnational dimension of the EU parliamentary field (Compare 
Bursens et al. 2012).
1
 
The theoretical and empirical relevance of adding subnational parliaments (hereafter SP) to the 
picture has normative as well as efficiency related explanations. First of all, SP are legitimate and 
directly-elected institutions representing the “multiple demoi” of the EU (Benz 2011). The Special 
Eurobarometer (307/2009) revealed that while only one third of Europeans tend to trust their national 
governments (34%), half of the citizens express trust towards their regional and local authorities 
(50%). The same survey showed also that a majority of Europeans feel that public authorities at the 
subnational level are not sufficiently taken into account in EU policy-making (59%). These findings 
imply that EU citizens not only entrust SP with significant scope of political responsibility, but they 
also expect regional responsiveness to the possibility of “being consulted” on EU related issues. As 
there is an extensive overlap between regional and EU competences in various policy areas and SP 
implement over 70% of EU legislation and programmes (Christiansen and Lintner 2005), their 
knowledge of EU policies affect the quality and timeliness of the legal transposition. Moreover, acting 
closest to the people, SP are able to capture social demands and represent them along the EU decision-
making process.  
In this regard, the Lisbon Treaty recognizes, for the first time, SP with legislative powers as a 
separate category of democratic institutions with the right to participate in the control of EU legislative 
process. Protocol no. 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality attached 
to the Treaty of Lisbon (hereafter Protocol no. 2 TL) includes SP into the subsidiarity scrutiny process 
called the ‘early warning system’ (EWS) by stating: “it will be for each national Parliament or each 
chamber of a national Parliament to consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative 
powers”. Such institutional innovation not only extends the EU channel of representative democracy 
to the subnational level, but also provides field for analysis of the newly emerging inter-institutional 
dynamics in EU decentralised systems. Since national transposition of the EWS depends exclusively 
on Member States and their intergovernmental arrangements, we can expect considerable cross-
country variations in the pace and scope of the subnational parliamentary mobilization in EU policy 
control. Shedding light on these variations and the way in which SP interact with other institutional 
                                                     
1
 There are currently 74 subnational parliaments in the EU, who exercise constitutionally attributed law-making 
competences in various fields of policy. They can be found in eight EU member states: three federal (Austria, Belgium 
and Germany), two regionalized (Spain, Italy), one devolved (the UK) and two unitary states (Portugal - Madeira and 
Azores; and Finland - Åland Islands). Their legislative capacity varies from one Member State to another.  
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actors in European affairs is necessary to further our understanding of the dynamics at play in the EU 
multi-level policy process. 
The scholarship on subnational mobilization in the EU has been primarily focused on local and 
regional governments (Callanan 2012; Bauer et al. 2010 among others) and regional offices in 
Brussels (Rowe 2011; Tatham 2008; Marks et al. 2002; Jeffery 1996 among others). Cases of 
subnational parliamentary activity have been analysed mainly in single country studies and mostly 
from a legal point of view (Carmona Contreras 2012; Palomares Amat 2011; Abels and Eppler 2011; 
Heggie 2006). To date, some comparative attempts to capture the role of SP under the EWS 
(Borońska-Hryniewiecka 2013; Vara Arribas and Bourdin 2011) provide institutional overview of the 
subsidiarity scrutiny procedures but lack the explanatory framework accounting for the variations in 
the parliamentary mobilization patterns. 
This article aims to fill this gap by shedding light on the factors explaining SP’s differential 
engagement in EU policy scrutiny under the EWS. It adopts a theoretically informed comparison of 
subnational parliamentary mobilization (hereafter SPM) in the framework of the EWS in Germany, 
Spain and the United Kingdom. The analysis draws from original data obtained from interviews and 
institutional documents. Building on the neo-institutional approach to Europeanization, this research 
identifies factors affecting SPM in ex-ante EU policy control which have not been addressed so far in 
a single study. The proposed theoretical framework bridges the gap between micro-level explanations 
of individual resources and capacities with macro-level factors of a country’s constitutional status, 
providing a more contextualized account for SPM in EU policy control. This paper claims that the two 
most important variables deciding about the scope and effectiveness of parliamentary engagement in 
the EWS are two meso-level factors of (1) the relationship between the executive and legislature at the 
subnational level and (2) the position of the regional executive in domestic governance arrangements. 
While focusing on the EWS, this paper acknowledges that the scope of parliamentary EU oriented 
activity goes beyond the subsidiarity scrutiny, and therefore poses a question in what ways the 
domestic institutional arrangements influence SP’s EU strategies in a broader framework of EU 
affairs. 
This article is organized in the following way. Section one provides a conceptual framework for the 
main objects of analysis. Section two presents theoretical assumptions and hypotheses regarding 
subnational parliamentary mobilization in EU policy-control. Section three provides an overview of 
the applied methodology and data sources. Finally, section four presents the findings on the basis of 
comparative case studies. The article finishes with systematized conclusions and their implications for 
further research.  
1. The ‘Early Warning System’ as Europeanization mechanism  
Under the EWS, national parliaments have eight weeks from the date of transmission of an EU draft 
legislative act to scrutinize it and issue a reasoned opinion stating why they consider that the draft in 
question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Depending on the number of reasoned 
opinions, the Commission might have to reconsider, amend or withdraw its proposal (Art. 6-7 of the 
Protocol no. 2).
2
 The aim of this paper is not to assess the effectiveness of the EWS, which has been 
already attempted by many authors (Cooper 2012; Kiiver 2012; Raunio 2010; Piris 2010; Maurer 
2008) but to analyze its impact on SPM. For this purpose, the EWS will be conceptualized here as 
Europeanization mechanism which exerts pressure at domestic level.  
While Radaelli (2003, 30) defines Europeanization as institutionalization of formal and informal 
rules, procedures and “ways of doing things”, firstly defined at EU level and then incorporated into the 
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 In fact, parliaments take a broader scope in their analyses exploring the content and the impact of the potential legislation 
at the domestic level. 
Subnational parliaments in EU policy control: explaining the variations across Europe. 
11 
domestic contexts, Risse et al. (2001, 2) point to its functional dimension and see it as an emergence 
of problem-solving structures of governance which formalize interactions among different actors. 
Finally, rational choice institutionalism conceives Europeanization as an emerging political 
opportunity structure which offers some actors additional resources to exert influence, while 
constrains the ability of others to pursue their goals (Börzel and Risse 2000, 6). The EWS combines 
these functions in a single framing mechanism.  
Firstly, the EWS becomes a catalyst for the exercise of the already attributed legislative 
competences of SP transferred to the EU and restores the subnational representative function through 
linking political decisions at the supranational level with citizens’ preferences on the ground. In this 
sense, the EWS becomes a legislative transmission belt between the Commission, the Member States’ 
parliaments and the subnational assemblies who through cooperation and exchange of views reinforce 
each other’s legitimacy (Compare Hurrelmann 2007). Secondly, the EWS was created to address a 
particular collective problem of democratic deficit and lack of accountability of the EU (De Wilde 
2012; Cooper 2012). It this sense, the scrutiny procedure was to become the way in which EU 
legislator justifies his actions before a forum of national (and subnational) parliaments under the threat 
of consequences (i.e. “yellow” or “orange card”). The increased capacity of parliaments to keep track 
of EU policy-making through their involvement in the EWS should – ideally – translate into 
deepening of its legitimacy. Finally, the Protocol no. 2 TL, for the first time, provides SP with a legal 
base for participation in EU legislative process. Although SP hold legislative competences in the 
sphere of domestic policy-making, the complex system of EU multi-level governance challenged their 
ability to control European policy-making and the actions of their executives. The shift of power to the 
executive branch has been often referred to as (de-) parliamentarization, both at the national and 
subnational level (O’Brennan and Raunio 2007). The EWS establishes the first, albeit mediated, 
interface between the subnational parliaments and the European Commission. In this sense, it becomes 
an opportunity structure for SP to renegotiate their controlling and oversight powers in EU affairs vis-
à-vis their subnational executives. Moreover, the EWS, has also given SP possibility to become direct 
interlocutors vis-à-vis national parliaments.  
In line with Europeanization literature, it is assumed that the EWS exerts certain influence on 
domestic actors and their hitherto established relations. As a result of some degree of ‘misfit’ between 
the ‘new’ European and the ‘old’ domestic level processes, EWS produces certain ‘inconvenience’ on 
the side of domestic actors, constituting adaptational pressures (Börzel and Risse 2000). It also creates 
new patterns of interactions between the central and subnational authorities, as well as between the 
executives and legislatures, not infrequently leading to challenging the well-established hierarchies. 
2. Theoretical explanations  
The literature on territorial mobilization in Europe provides alternative explanations as to the scope of 
the regional involvement in EU affairs. At the micro level, in line with the logic of resource 
dependency, it is assumed that individual resources (i.e. organizational capacities, expertise or 
economic position) of a region influence the scope and quality of subnational mobilization in the EU 
(Börzel 2002; Blatter et al. 2008). These arguments are usually linked with the macro-level factor of 
constitutional status of a region marked by the degree of country’s decentralization on the axis from a 
unitary to federal state. In this regard, taking that regions of federal states have more at stake in terms 
of the scope of their powers and the overlap between their and EU competences than their counterparts 
in regionalized or unitary systems, it is assumed that higher levels of devolution result in stronger 
subnational mobilization in EU affairs (Marks et al. 1996; Hocking 1997; Keating and Hooghe 2006). 
This has been empirically confirmed with regard to the regional activity in Brussels (Marks et al. 
2002; Jeffery 2000; Tatham 2008). At the same time, it has been shown that a higher level of 
devolution in a Member State leads to more cooperation between subnational and national authorities 
in domestic EU policy-making (Tatham 2011).  
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka 
12 
Yet, while important for identifying the inter-regional patterns of mobilization in EU affairs, these 
two factors fail to explain the variations at subnational parliamentary level such as relatively low 
degrees of activity in federal states like Germany or Austria as compared with, for example, Spain or 
the UK, thus failing to account for cross-country patterns. Moreover, neither of them explains the 
systemic differences in the inter-parliamentary relations between national and subnational level. They 
simply overlook, or underestimate, factors which affect the position of SP domestic governance 
arrangements. 
To be able to elucidate the main variables behind SPM and the subsequent inter-level parliamentary 
cooperation under the EWS, the theoretical framework applied in this paper bridges rational choice 
and historical explanations of the new institutionalism (North 1990; March and Olsen 2005). While 
broadly assuming that institutions shape political actors’ behaviour and interactions (Héritier 2007), 
rational choice approach focuses on individual interests, strategies, capacities and constrains (Peters 
2011, 47-49), and historical perspective emphasizes the influence of institutionally developed patterns 
of interactions, pointing to path dependency explanations (Pierson 2000, 252). 
Institutions are structures of incentives, hence, it is assumed that SP will use the new opportunity 
structure of the EWS in order to gain influence over EU policy and to restore a controlling function 
vis-à-vis their governments. Consequently, driven by their purposeful behaviour, SP will deploy 
resources, comply with the newly established rules and engage in interactions with other institutional 
actors in the framework of the EWS. Yet, while taking this perspective as a point of departure, this 
research agrees with the argument that new institutional rules induced by the EU might entail a 
difficult process mutual re-structuring which is likely to affect the integration and coherence of 
domestic institutional systems (Kohler-Koch 2005). As a result of external pressures, domestic actors 
will show resilience towards change. The extent of their adaptation will depend on the institutional 
“goodness of fit” between the EU and domestic level as well as the existence of various mediating 
factors (Börzel 2005). Broad literature on Europeanization emphasizes that due to the varying nature 
of such factors responses to EU induced changes are uneven (Börzel and Risse 2000; Jachtenfuchs and 
Kohler-Koch 2004). These arguments resonate with path dependency approach emphasizing how the 
domestic institutional traditions and practices embedded over time influence the development of new 
governance styles and inter-institutional relations (Peters 2011).  
We can thus expect that the transposition of the EWS into national contexts will be conditioned by 
institutional governance arrangements and practices already in place. Consequently, we can expect 
that its implementation will vary across Member States depending on the commitment of various 
institutional actors to transform the EU legal provisions into effective political tools. These are often 
expressed in endogenous institutional changes, development of informal mechanisms and lower-order 
rules (Héritier 2007) which selection does not have unbiased, neutral character but is rooted in 
particular institutional traditions and political values. In other words, traditions governing the relations 
among particular institutional actors will be of crucial importance in determining the scope and nature 
of subnational parliamentary mobilization under the EWS. 
Accepting the above arguments, this research suggests that the main explanatory factors behind  
SPM are two meso-level variables: (1) the relationship between executive and legislature at 
subnational level and (2) the position of subnational executive in domestic governance arrangements. 
The meso nature of these factors stems from the fact that they refer to “infrastructural context” of 
domestic institutional relations situated between the individual region’s capacities and the 
constitutional status of the state (For different conceptualization of meso-level factors see: 
Elbasani and Saatçioğlu 2013). 
2.1 The relationship between the executive and legislature 
The European integration and the emergence of EU multilevel governance is widely thought to 
weaken parliaments and to strengthen governments (Raunio 2007; Follesdal and Hix 2006). Regional 
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governments have acquired more expertise in European affairs through participation in domestic EU 
decision-making as well as through representing their regions in Brussels. In this regard, the 
recognition of parliamentary autonomy to scrutinize EU legislation and issue opinions on thereof 
increases SP’s ability to control, or limit the domination, of regional governments. In this sense, the 
nature of executive-legislature relationship becomes crucial for the parliamentary mobilization. This 
variable primarily concerns the right of SP to timely information, consultation and decision-making 
powers over the government. It can be operationalized by looking at whether executive-legislature 
relation is based on cooperation, competition or dependency; whether there is expertise and 
information sharing or rather its monopolization by either institution; and finally, who is the 
protagonist under the EWS, i.e. who receives information first and who has the ‘last say’ in the 
procedure before issuing an opinion. It is assumed that cooperative relationship between the 
subnational government and parliament will help the latter one to perform its EU scrutiny function 
better and to become an active interlocutor in contacts with a national parliament. On the other hand, 
gate-keeping position or monopolization of information by SG will impede the protagonism of SP. 
From the above, two complementary hypotheses can be drawn:  
H1: Cooperative relations between SG and SP will lead to a stronger subnational  
parliamentary mobilization under the EWS.  
H1a: Monopolization of information by SG will inhibit the subnational parliamentary  
mobilization under the EWS.  
2.2 The position of subnational executive in domestic governance arrangements 
This factor can be divided into two kinds of considerations. Primarily, it accounts for the nature of 
domestic relationship between regional and central level decision-makers and might be 
operationalized by looking at whether regional interests are negotiated in formalized, institutional 
forums open to parliamentary scrutiny, or are they rather agreed through informal relations between 
subnational and national ministers, conducted ‘behind closed doors’ and in confidential manner. In the 
latter case, if SG are used to monopolize information (H1a), the powers of SP become severely 
restricted and limited to rubber-stamping executive decisions. From the above, the following 
hypothesis can be generated: 
H2: Informal character or confidentiality of intergovernmental relations between SG and  
national decision-makers will inhibit subnational parliamentary mobilization under the EWS. 
Secondly, in decentralized and multi-layered states the domestic relationship between the regional and 
central level decision-makers is directly related to the role and composition of the second chamber 
(Swenden 2010) which function is often to represent subnational interest at the national level. 
According to the provisions of the Protocol 2 TL, in bicameral systems each chamber can cast one 
independent subsidiarity vote under the EWS. Strong territorial second chambers, composed of 
regional representatives, may act as facilitators in the vertical inter-parliamentary relations and voice 
subnational concerns in ex-ante EU scrutiny. However, if the second chamber is composed of 
members of regional governments (not parliaments), the situation gets complicated. It might be that 
instead of national parliaments consulting SP as to their opinions regarding EU legislation, national 
legislators cooperate with representatives of SG in the second chamber. In such case, while regional 
executives serve as legislatures at the national level, legislative functions of SP become significantly 
impeded. This leads to generation of the following hypothesis:  
H3: Representation of SG in the second chamber at the national level will inhibit  
subnational parliamentary mobilization under the EWS. 
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka 
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Figure 1. The model of the analyzed causal relationship 
__________________________The Early Warning System _____________________________ 
       
     assumption            →                  independent variable            →              dependent variable  
SP preference to gain                       - relations between SP and SG                                                SPM 
control over EU policy          - position of SG in domestic governance arrangements       
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. Methodology  
In order to assess how the two meso-level factors combine in explaining SPM in EU policy control, 
this paper uses comparative analysis of the EWS in Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom. The 
choice of the case studies was guided by a number of considerations. First of all, in these countries 
regions enjoy wide law-making competences in various fields of policy and the impact of EU law on 
the exercise of regional powers is considerable. They represent states where regional elections play 
significant role, voters identify with their regions and regional politics influences the political 
dynamics at the national level. However, apart from similarities, this case selection allows this 
research to account for different systemic factors which might affect the SPM, such as the 
constitutional setup of the state (federal, regionalized and devolved system) and the tradition of 
intergovernmental relations. Most importantly, there are differences in key variables of interest that is 
the relationship between the executive and legislature at the subnational level and the position of 
regional executive in domestic governance arrangements.  
3.1 Operationalization of the dependent variable  
The concept of subnational parliamentary mobilization is understood here as institutional and political 
activities of SP aimed at gaining influence over European affairs in the initial phase of EU policy-
cycle based on interaction with other institutional actors (i.e. national parliaments and regional 
governments) in ex-ante EU policy control. Taking into account that the engagement of SP in the 
EWS is voluntary, it is assumed that a meaningful inter-level parliamentary cooperation in EU 
legislative scrutiny will only take place if SP express interest and deploy certain resources, in other 
words, when they show the capacity to contribute as ‘input givers’ into the oversight of EU policy. 
For the purpose of this research, changes to the dependent variable are measured through a series of 
the following indicators: the existence at regional level of formal procedures to conduct subsidiarity 
scrutiny under the EWS; the number of subsidiarity analyses conducted by SP; the number of reasoned 
opinions issued by them in the framework of the EWS; the number of cases when regional 
observations were included into the national final opinion; the existence of direct inter-parliamentary 
communication and cooperation between the national and subnational level; and finally, SP’s 
perception of the EWS in operation. The abovementioned elements account for the institutional effects 
as well as changes in actor’s strategies and behavior, thus linking the structural and agency-driven 
explanations.  
3.2 Data sources 
This research is based on empirical data gathered from three different sources. The first one includes a 
questionnaire directed to SP in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Due to scarcity of evidence 
on subnational parliamentary participation in the EWS, direct contact was thought to be the best way 
of obtaining reliable information. Although primarily the questionnaire was targeted at politicians 
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presiding parliamentary EU commissions, in almost all cases their political secretariats directed me to 
legal advisers responsible for carrying out European affairs. The questionnaire was divided into four 
parts, each enquiring about different aspects of parliamentary experience in the EWS. The first section 
focused on institutional and structural changes which have taken place at the regional level in the 
context of the EWS. The second part regarded the hitherto record of participation in the procedure 
itself as well as enquired about the difficulties detected so far.
3
 The third one concerned the nature of 
inter-institutional cooperation. Here, the questions referred mainly to the relations with regional 
executives, national parliaments and other SP. The final section accounted for the attitude and 
perception of the members of SP towards the EWS, bringing to light the actor-centred dimension of 
the parliamentary experience. In many cases the questionnaires were complemented with further 
telephone interviews. As regards the gathered data, the questionnaires were completed by 20 out of 36 
SP (the response rate of 56 %): 8 German, 9 Spanish and 3 SP of the UK.
4
 As the response distribution 
illustrates, the data accounts for different types of regions, including those with stronger cultural 
identities and economic position, as well as those less resourceful.  
Bearing in mind, that the information obtained from SP might present certain bias (for example, 
regional officials may attempt to present  their institutions as active, Europeanized, influential), the 
questionnaires at the regional level were cross-checked with data from official documents related to 
parliamentary EU activities such as the existing regional regulations, statutes, strategies and activity 
reports. As regards tracing the regional parliamentary input into national reasoned opinions, the data 
was obtained from the Inter-parliamentary Information Exchange System (IPEX) which registers all 
parliamentary documents under the framework of the EWS. The third set of data consists of informal 
interviews and desk research carried in various waves at the Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the 
CoR between January 2011 and March 2012.  
4. Subnational parliamentary mobilization under the EWS 
4.1 Germany  
While German Länder are among the most active regional authorities in EU policy-making, their 
parliaments (Landtage) have been for a long time considerably marginalized in the sphere of European 
affairs. European integration, together with the centralization of German federalism, has clearly 
worked in favour of de-parliamentarization at the subnational level (Kropp 2012; Panara 2011; Bauer 
2005). The long tradition of intergovernmental cooperation and tight institutional linkages between 
national and subnational level in Germany largely neglects SP (Hrbek 2010; Abels 2012) which makes 
the German case especially intriguing (Stuchlik and Buzogany 2011). 
In the German complex system of “cooperative federalism” (Börzel 2001; Jeffery 1997) the 
dominant role in domestic EU policy-making is played by the executives. At the federal level, interests 
of the Länder are represented by the de-facto second chamber (Bundesrat), fully composed of 
delegates from regional governments. Since Bundesrat members are not elected - either by popular 
vote or by Landtage - but delegated by their respective Land government, composition of the second 
chamber clearly favours regional executives. As the consent of Bundesrat is required for well over half 
of the federal laws, Länder governments get engaged, at an early stage, in the federal legislative 
                                                     
3
 The data refers to the EWS experience in the time period 2011-2012.  
4
 In Germany: Berlin, Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, Bremen, Hessen, Saxony, Lower Saxony, Nordrhein-Westfalen; in 
Spain: Basque Country, Catalonia, Extremadura, Canary Islands, Galicia, Aragón, Murcia, Andalusia and Cantabria; in 
the UK: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
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process, which significantly impedes legislative functions of SP (Compare Abels 2012).
5
 In this regard 
Jeffery observes that in Germany large part of domestic decision-making is “conducted behind closed 
doors and tends to precook policy away from parliamentary scrutiny, with the Bundestag and Länder 
parliaments often effectively relegated to rubber-stamping devices” (1997,45). Kropp, on the other 
hand, argues that the “joint-decision making” model of German federalism (Scharpf 1988) based on 
obligatory cooperation and institutionalized veto points weakens SP in yet another way. She points out 
the fact that if executives do not agree on a common stance in federal negotiations, SP cannot preserve 
their legislative function by imposing their solutions since the executives can “deviate from 
parliamentary decisions referring to inescapable concessions to be made in order to avoid gridlock” 
(2012:7). In other words, SP do not have the right to influence their executives leading negotiations in 
the Bundesrat.  
Such domestic governance arrangements clearly affect participation of the Landtage in the EWS. 
While at the federal level the subsidiarity check has been integrated into the regular decision-making 
process and the voice of the Länder is mediated through the executive-dominated Bundesrat, Landtage 
lose their protagonism. Due to absence of a national level regulation ensuring SP participation in the 
scrutiny procedure, as well as a direct channel of communication between the SP and the federal 
legislator, effective SPM depends to a great extent on the nature of SP relations with SG. These have 
been traditionally based on a domination of the latter ones not only thanks to their expertise and 
acquired EU experience, but also to the systemic provisions discussed above.  
As regards the reception of EU documents necessary to conduct scrutiny under the EWS, these are 
forwarded to regional executives bypassing the SP. While for a long time SG could be selective in 
sharing information with their legislatures, only recently the latter ones have gained the right to be 
fully informed by their governments in EU affairs (Abels 2012). However, when expressing 
parliamentary opinion on EU topics, SP are still dependent on governmental expertise (Vara Arribas 
and Bourdin 2011:51).  
In terms of the changes to the dependent variable, Länder parliaments have undertaken a series of 
lobbying activities at the federal level to regain control over executives and to increase their say in 
domestic EU policy-making. In the 2010 “Stuttgart Declaration”, Presidents of all Landtage demanded 
an extension of participatory and information rights of SP through changing the ancillary law on 
Länder EU involvement (EUZBLG). Over the last years, they have also undertaken a number of 
procedural and organisational adaptations to adjust to the provisions of the Lisbon Protocol. However, 
the research suggests that the new regulations established at the regional level are weak and mostly 
lack institutional safeguards. According to the questionnaires, only four Landtage established specific 
internal procedures to perform the work under the EWS (Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, North Rhine-
Westphalia and Berlin). Majority rely on the non-binding agreements recently negotiated with their 
governments on the improved information and scrutiny rights in domestic and EU affairs 
(Brandenburg, Hamburg, Hessen, Rhineland-Palatine, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia). 
In their case however, the information rights are typically limited to issues of “vital importance” for 
the Länder, which is left to the decision of SG.  
The overall regional record of subnational parliamentary input under the EWS is rather poor (See 
Annex 1), ranging from no experience so far (Bremen, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Hamburg, Saxony or 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania) through occasional activity (Berlin, Hessen) to regular scrutiny in case 
of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg. The latter are however the most resourceful regions in Europe 
whose EU-oriented activity is exceptionally advanced and might be compared to this of a state. 
Therefore, their examples should not serve to draw generalizations about the overall systemic pattern, 
                                                     
5
 Decisions regarding European affairs are taken in the Bundesrat Chamber for European Affairs (Europakammer) (Article 
53.3a of Basic Law) which enables Länder governments to communicate and agree in an efficient way views on EU 
policy without going through a plenary session. 
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which is that majority of Landtage incline towards more controlling function rather than pro-active 
contribution under the EWS. 
As regards the influence of parliamentary opinions in the EWS, the scrutiny power of SP is limited 
in the sense that in case of a disagreement with a SG, SP cannot use veto to change government’s 
decision (Vara Arribas and Bourdin 2011:50). In other words, SG are not bound by Landtage’s 
decisions. No concrete data exists on the inclusion of SP observations into federal reasoned opinions. 
Since these are Länder governments who involve the Landtage in the EWS, there is no immediate 
register of parliamentary opinions at the federal level. In the period 2011-2012 neither of the federal 
reasoned opinions referred to regional parliamentary input (IPEX source).
6
 
The existing intergovernmental arrangements also affect the SP’s perception of their roles in EU 
policy-control. Questionnaires revealed that in spite of a general interest in the procedure widely 
perceived as an opportunity structure to gain more visibility in EU affairs, SP do not see themselves as 
protagonists in legislative scrutiny but rather accept the primacy of their governments, on which - as 
underlined - they “rely in terms of information and expertise”. Some of the respondents do not even 
see the need to reform the existing mechanisms and to establish direct inter-parliamentary channel of 
communication between the Landtage and the Bundestag or Bundesrat (i.e. Berlin, Saxony-Anhalt, 
Nordrhein-Westfalen). There are also sceptical voices describing members of the Landtage as “part-
time legislators” who due to “low profile” of their institutions often continue to “pursue other 
professions outside the assembly” (i.e. Berlin).  
Finally, the inertia of domestic governance arrangements influences broader EU strategies of SP. In 
case of more resourceful Landtage, certain degree of state bypassing and EU level capacity building 
can be observed. Parliaments of Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg and North-Rhine Westphalia 
established their offices in Brussels to be informed, often well before the legislative scrutiny takes 
place, about any significant policy developments which might affect regional interests. This allows SP 
to gain control over EU policy outside of the domestic governmental arrangements. On the other hand, 
less resourceful Landtage express a rather permissive consensus towards the status quo and seem to 
rely on the “voluntary underuse of their participatory rights” (Bauer 2005), limiting their role to a 
receptive control of the executive.  
4.2 Spain 
Although not constituting a federal state, the Spanish comunidades autónomas (CCAA) enjoy a wide 
catalogue of legislative competences ranging from agriculture, environment, infrastructure and 
regional development to health and social policy, increasingly overlapping with EU competences. 
While European integration has reinforced the Spanish regional executives over legislatures in 
domestic EU decision-making (Carmona Contreras 2012; Closa and Heywood 2004; Campos Biglino 
2003), this process has been less institutionalized than in the case of Germany and, therefore, remained 
more open to adaptive changes exerted by the EWS.  
As regards the variable of the position of regional executive in domestic governance arrangements, 
contrary to the German case, Spanish SG do not perform the function of co-legislators at national 
level, simply because they are not represented in any of the national parliamentary chambers. Spain is 
a very clear case of asymmetrical bicameralism most of all since the Congress can override most of 
Senate’s decisions by a simple majority. The Spanish Senate has been designed as a weaker body of 
limited decision-making powers, both in domestic as well as European affairs (Palomares Amat 2001). 
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 The list of the opinions issued so far by the German Bundesrat: COM (2010) 0369 on deposit guarantee scheme; 
COM(2011) 0654 on criminal sanctions while dealing with data manipulation; COM(2011) 0793 on consumer disputes; 
COM(2011) 0828 on noise related operating restrictions; COM (2011) 0897 on public procurement; COM(2012) 0010 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities; COM(2012) 0011 
on general data protection. 
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However, unlike in the German case, Senate’s composition links national and subnational 
parliamentary level to a certain extent, as 25% of the senators are appointed directly by SP. This 
favours, albeit rather symbolically, the regional parliamentary oversight of national level decision-
making. In fact, this territorial link is too weak to allow the Senate to participate in a relevant way in 
voicing the interests of CCAA in forming the Spanish position before the EU. Regional interests are 
represented and negotiated at the national level in the Conference on Issues Related with European 
Union and in a system of Sectoral Conferences. Research as well as literature indicate that decision-
making process within the Conferences is not very well institutionalized and significantly politicized 
due to its dependency on the respective regional majorities (Arbós Marin et al. 2009). Such state of 
affairs makes parliamentary scrutiny easier and allows SP to at least “debate” policy solutions at the 
regional level before they enter into the Conference.  
Parliaments of CCAA are included into the EWS through a national-level regulation (Law 24/2009 
amended by Law 38/2010). The organ responsible for the exercise of the EWS is the Joint Committee 
of the Congress and Senate for the European Union which channels all EU legislative proposals to SP 
without any filtering procedure. Once SP receive a draft legislative act, they may draw up a report if 
they consider that, firstly, their competences are affected, and secondly, the principle of subsidiarity 
has been violated. Contrary to the German case, SP have the priority in obtaining EU documents from 
the national parliament, and they forward them to their regional governments. Although SP are not 
obliged to consult or adjust their stances with the regional government
7
, the findings reveal that 
majority of the Spanish SP systematically collaborate with the executive branch in subsidiarity checks 
(e.g. Cantabria, Basque Country, Canary Islands, Galicia). Others perform their scrutiny functions 
independently (e.g. Catalonia). The respondents from SP have observed that as a result of the EWS, 
communication between the executive and legislature has improved and is increasingly based on 
mutual assistance. While this is also true in case of the German Länder, in the Spanish case the 
relationship between SP and SG is based on a stronger informational and political autonomy of the 
former one. On the one hand, regional executives are used by SP to help build necessary expertise and 
“EU sensibility”, on the other hand, since the analysis of subsidiarity is fundamentally political, SG - 
as admitted by a Basque representative - see it crucial to submit EU projects to a political debate 
within the parliament, a debate which ideally “allows taking into account all circumstantial parameters 
and results in authentic involvement of all political parties”.  
As regards the changes to the dependent variable, fifteen out of seventeen SP have incorporated 
new provisions for subsidiarity control into their legal frameworks. Since 2006 eight CCAA amended 
their statutes of autonomy including their legislative assemblies into the subsidiarity consultation 
process.
8
 Others, such as SP of the Basque Country, Madrid, Canary Islands, Galicia, Asturias, 
Cantabria and La Rioja established specific internal regulations to perform the work under the EWS. 
Only the SP of Murcia and Aragón have not adopted any specific procedures. Yet, paradoxically, 
Cortes de Aragón is one of the most active SP in the EWS scrutiny.  
Although the data regarding the parliamentary activity in the framework of the EWS reveals some 
disproportions among CCAA, the overall relative scrutiny record is the highest among the analyzed 
Member States (See Annex 1). The most active SP are the Basque Country, Aragón and Extremadura 
which account for over 65% of the opinions. Such data confirms that subnational parliamentary 
mobilization does not so much depend on financial and administrative resources or cultural 
distinctiveness of a region. Other SP (e.g. Catalonia, Canary Islands) are more selective in choosing 
the relevant EU drafts for analysis. Only four SP have not conducted any analyses so far (e.g. 
Andalusia, Asturias, Balearic Islands and La Rioja).  
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 In fact, regional executives in Spain have been granted the possibility to voice subsidiarity related concerns before the 
Joint Committee (Law 38/2010), they however do this through their SP. 
8
 Valencia (2006), Catalonia (2006), Balearic Islands (2007), Andalusia (2007), Aragón (2007), Castilla y León (2007), 
Navarra (2010), Extremadura (2011) 
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As regards the inclusion of regional observations into the national opinion, from the formal point of 
view, although the Joint Committee is not legally bound to take into account the input of SP, it should 
incorporate the list of regional reports and references to the relevant documents. The data extracted 
from IPEX database reveal a positive picture regarding the reception of regional input by the Joint 
Commission. All reasoned opinions issued by Cortes Generales in the period 2011-2012 
acknowledged the reports of SP referring to concrete parliamentary assemblies.
9
 For example, in 2012, 
the final national opinion regarding the Proposal for a Regulation on European Statistics 
(COM/2012/167) included explicit reference to the contents of regional reports stating that the 
proposal represents “interference in the organisation of competences of the Member States” (IPEX). 
This opinion was also conveyed to EU institutions within the framework of the “Political Dialogue”10 
to which the European Commission answered in December 2012. In this case, however, regional 
opinions stayed in line with the stance of the Joint Committee. It remains to be seen how the 
Committee responds in case of differing points of view at the national and subnational level.  
In terms of regional perception of the EWS, the questionnaires revealed that majority of 
respondents perceive it as an opportunity structure to “get out of an institutional limbo in the sphere of 
European affairs”, but at the same time emphasize that it requires considerable institutional effort. 
Greater parliamentary experience allowed CCAA for some constructive criticism and strategy 
adjustment. In contrast to their German counterparts, more Spanish respondents express skepticism as 
to effectiveness of the EWS and complain that the design of the procedure does not allow to 
meaningfully influencing the EU policy process (e.g. Basque Country, Canary Islands). The 
questionnaires revealed an increasing tendency of the Spanish SP to be more selective in choosing EU 
dossiers and to conducting broader analyses, beyond the scope of subsidiarity, including observations 
about the proportionality and policy contents.  
As regards changes to parliamentary EU strategies, due to facilitating domestic governance 
arrangements, SP tend to focus on the improvement of the domestic parliamentary channel of 
cooperation, rather than to seek external influence. To this end, joint technical sessions and trainings 
are organized between the lawyers responsible for subsidiarity scrutiny in SP and the national 
parliament. In 2011 the Conference of Presidents of the Spanish Autonomous Parliaments 
(COPREPA) prepared a handbook facilitating elaboration of regional opinions within the EWS 
(Carmona Contreras 2012: 165). SP also recently established an inter-parliamentary online 
communication network, Red_Parlamenta which facilitates the exchange of scrutiny information.  
4.3 United Kingdom  
The research reveals that although the devolved legislatures of Scotland and Wales have the shortest 
experience of the EU, their awareness, engagement and internal specialisation in the field of European 
affairs is relatively well advanced. This might be due to the fact, that as young parliaments (created 
only in 1999), they had to face the challenge of extensive Europeanization already at the time of their 
establishment. In case of the Northern Ireland Assembly (NIA), due to political unrest its 
parliamentary experience was suspended between 2002 and 2007.  
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 The list of opinions issued by the Mixed Commission: COM (2011) 215 and 216 implementing enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements; 
COM(2011)0169 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity; COM 
(2011) 896 and 897 on public procurement; COM (2012)167 concerning European Statistics 
10
 Under Political Dialogue (known also as ‘Barroso Initiative’) the Commission transmits all new proposals and 
consultation papers directly to national parliaments and invites them to give comments, criticism and positive feedback 
regarding their contents. Within the scope of the PD, parliaments can assess the compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity, proportionality, conferral and political accountability. Although the character of the PD is informal and non-
binding for the Commission, it usually takes notice of their comments. It can be said that the EWS is a ‘hard core’ of the 
broader PD. 
Karolina Borońska-Hryniewiecka 
20 
The degree of devolution in the UK is asymmetrical but the impact of EU law on the exercise of 
devolved matters is considerable in each of the regions. The most important matters affected by EU 
policy-making are agriculture, fisheries, economic development, environment and energy.
11
 Although 
neither of the devolved regions enjoy constitutional right to participate in domestic EU policy-making, 
intergovernmental relations in the sphere of European affairs are covered by less formal arrangements, 
such as constitutional conventions and legally non-binding agreements known as Concordats or 
Memorandum of Understanding (Varney 2011). While the Memorandum provides for the inclusion of 
devolved administrations in the formulation of UK’s policy position on EU affairs, the Concordats 
provide a general framework for inter-level cooperation. Similarly to the German case, systemic 
arrangements have favoured devolved executives as regards the right to information, participation and 
representation of the regional position in EU affairs. The roles of SP were left to be agreed at 
subnational level and were generally limited to scrutinizing EU documents (Hoegenauer 2012). In this 
context, however, it is important to note that, the Devolution Act has rebalanced the relationship 
between legislature and executive at the subnational level, departing from the Westminster model 
(Fasone 2012). It was achieved by granting SP more robust institutional structures and controlling 
powers that those enjoyed originally by the Westminster. The new arrangements which set up the 
devolved legislatures in Scotland and Wales met with ambitions to enhance the role of parliamentary 
European affairs committees (Randall and Seawright 2002). Oversight and scrutiny of EU documents 
was therefore on top of SP’s political agenda from the very onset (Hazell and Paun 2010).  
As regards the variable of the relationship between the regional executive and legislature, Scottish 
and Welsh parliaments developed a relatively strong controlling position in ex-ante review of EU 
policy and as well as good communication with regional executives before they engage in the 
formulation of the UK position (Compare Fasone 2012). In order to gain more independence vis-à-vis 
regional executives, both devolved legislatures invested considerable effort to set up specialized EU 
committees and establish direct links with Brussels to obtain relevant information. In spite of the 
initial organizational and capacity problems (Carter and McLeod 2005; Heggie 2003) the two SP have 
managed to develop an early engagement approach based upon intelligence gathering and policy 
analysis at the pre-legislative phase of EU policy-making. Internally, to ensure their legislative control, 
they developed procedures to hold the executive to account for its actions in the European field, as 
ministers might be called to provide evidence to EU parliamentary committees on their work (Vara 
Arribas and Bourdin 2011: 129). The process was gradually facilitated by SG who agreed to share 
more information with their legislators. The situation looks different in case of the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (NIA). According to the feedback received from the NIA, the internal arrangements for EU 
scrutiny in the NI government are still in the early stages themselves and there is generally no 
willingness to cooperate or to provide the Assembly with information on either subsidiarity or on other 
EU-related issues.  
The relationship between SP and SG is especially important in the UK since the domestic 
relationship between the regional executive and central level decision-makers makes effective 
parliamentary scrutiny difficult to achieve. The two main challenges are the informal and ad hoc 
nature of large part of intergovernmental negotiations and the emphasis on confidentiality 
(Hoegenauer 2012). Moreover, the British second chamber does not facilitate legislative control of 
domestic EU policy-making at the subnational level. Composition of the House of Lords is entirely 
independent from territorial criteria and does not represent interests of the devolved territories.  
Implementation of the EWS into the domestic order, reflects the established patterns of domestic 
governance based on informality, flexibility and unwritten codes of conduct. In spite of the absence of 
formal provisions for cooperation between the UK Parliament and the devolved legislatures under the 
                                                     
11
 The Scotland Act of 2012 extended the Scottish legislative competences to new policy areas and granted it further fiscal 
devolution; the Government of Wales Act of 2006 conferred legislative authority to the Welsh Assembly, which was 
approved in the 2011 referendum. 
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EWS, the House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, in its 2008 report on “Subsidiarity, 
National Parliaments and the Lisbon Treaty”, placed the responsibility on the devolved assemblies to 
examine EU draft legislation and inform the House about possible objections. It also invited the 
comments of the devolved assemblies on the Committee's draft opinions on matters affecting their 
competences. The position of the House of Lords was quite more reserved, as it perceived the Treaty 
provision to consult SP to be explored on a “case by case basis” (HoL 2009). However, the HoL 
elaborated a handbook on EU policy scrutiny stating that if a subsidiarity issue is raised at staff level 
of the HoL, the EU Liaison Officer will alert the devolved legislatures in due time. Moreover, EU 
committees of the HoL and HoC have agreed to receive and translate the subsidiarity concerns of the 
Scottish Parliament (Vara Arribas and Bourdin 2011). To sum up, it could be stated that the UK 
provisions for inter-level parliamentary communication lie halfway between the formally 
institutionalized arrangements present in Spain and absence of any facilitating mechanisms in 
Germany. 
As regards the right to information, all documents necessary to conduct the scrutiny under the EWS 
are transmitted to SP via the UK and devolved governments. At this stage, there is no direct contact 
between SP and the Houses of Parliament. The UK government in consultation with the devolved 
executives have the priority in elaborating EU draft legislation and issuing Explanatory Memoranda 
outlining their positions on EU proposals. The aforementioned pre-legislative engagement of SP 
allows them to pursue and select early information in order to perform the correct oversight of their 
governments. This however costs SP more institutional effort than their German and Spanish 
counterparts (Compare Heggie 2003). In this regard, as the Scottish respondent noticed, “informal 
contacts with staff members of the UK parliament play important role”.  
In terms of changes to the dependent variable, the research reveals that while the initial phase of 
implementation uncovered a number of weaknesses in the parliamentary scrutiny, it also allowed for 
substantial improvements. According to the questionnaires, SP of Scotland and Wales established their 
internal scrutiny procedures and perform analyses under the EWS. The NIA is currently designing a 
new process for subsidiarity scrutiny. In Wales, the Committee for European Affairs has adopted a 
strategic approach based on identifying, at the earliest, pre-legislative stage, the most relevant 
proposals from the European Commission Legislative and Work Programme and to focus its work on 
those areas. The Scottish Parliament appointed a special EU Reporter to lead the parliamentary 
scrutiny work and liaising directly with other institutional actors, i.e. regional government and UK 
parliament (Scottish Parliament 2010). The greater specialisation provided by European Affairs 
Committees promotes an internal division of labour and accumulation of expert knowledge that aids 
parliaments when dealing with complex European policy issues (Raunio and Hix 2000).  
As regards the scrutiny record, while in 2010 no opinions were issued by either of the SP, the years 
2011-2012 witnessed an increase in the number of analysed EU proposals. According to the reports 
issued by the European and External Relations Committee, the Scottish Parliament identified six EU 
legislative proposals as raising possible subsidiarity concerns but due to logistic limitations 
communicated its views to the House of Lords and House of Commons in three cases 
(COM/2012/0034; COM/2011/0896 and COM/2011/0897). The National Assembly of Wales 
indicated that its Legal Services analyzed 29 EU draft legislative acts under the EWS. Out of these, 
one was identified as raising subsidiarity concerns (i.e. COM/2011/896 on public procurement). The 
NIA has so far issued one reasoned opinion (COM/2012/380). 
Although the UK Parliament is under no formal obligation to accept views expressed by the 
devolved legislatures under the EWS, the experience reveals its receptiveness. So far, in all the above 
mentioned cases, reports of the devolved assemblies were taken into account in the final national 
opinions (IPEX database). However, in spite of the inter-level parliamentary communication in place, 
SP’s perception of the effectiveness and significance of the EWS is, similarly to the Spanish case, 
rather critical. As the Scottish interviewee explained “I would argue that it has not been a success, 
either at a national or a regional level. The amount of effort required from all levels within a 
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parliament to provide an opinion is considerable. Thereafter the national parliament opinions have had 
little impact on the progress of (EU) legislation. Where a parliament feels strongly about an issue there 
are other avenues for seeking change at earlier stages; seeking to change a draft legislative proposal is 
too late”. It is, however, important to notice, that the interviewee did not attribute this weakness to the 
nature of the domestic governance arrangements but rather to the limited scope of the EWS itself.  
Such attitude is linked to a broader EU parliamentary strategy of the devolved parliaments. 
Similarly to their more resourceful German counterparts, British SP seek to gain external influence in 
European affairs through pre-legislative lobbying, networking and policy control often bypassing the 
national level. The Scottish and Welsh Parliaments established their offices in Brussels to keep their 
members informed about relevant developments in EU agenda. SP have also started forging closer ties 
with MEPs and practice short secondments to the European Parliament.  
Conclusion 
Research on subnational parliamentary mobilization in EU policy control remains a difficult task 
because researchers encounter enormous difficulties when drawing general conclusions. Each 
decentralized case is singular with respect to its genesis, institutional architecture and social 
embeddedness of the analyzed institutions. Notwithstanding, the analysis of Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom confirm the main theoretical assumption that changes to the dependent variable are 
mediated through the two meso-level factors of the relationship between the executive and legislature 
at the subnational level, and the position of regional executive in domestic governance arrangements. 
The research reveals that the nature and scope of parliamentary mobilization varies between Spain, 
Germany and the UK depending on the configuration of these meso-level factors. At the same time, it 
shows that the macro-level factor of constitutional setup of a state does not explain the cross-country 
patterns of parliamentary activity.  
Disregarding some degree of intra-state variations among the less and more resourceful regions, 
and looking at the systemic patterns in the three Member States, it can be concluded that the SPM is 
the strongest in Spain, weaker in the UK and the weakest in Germany. In Spain, the SPM is facilitated 
by cooperative relations between regional executives and legislatures, informational priority of SP, 
transparent and open to parliamentary scrutiny relationship between regional governments and 
national level decision-makers as well as, albeit weakly, by the composition of the second chamber. In 
the UK, SPM has been initially hampered by the gate-keeping position of regional executives as well 
as the confidential and informal character of intergovernmental relation between the devolved and UK 
governments. Over time, however, the relationship between the devolved governments and 
parliaments has evolved towards more cooperative, which facilitated SP scrutiny of EU legislation. 
Although the position of devolved executives in domestic governance arrangements is still privileged, 
as they enjoy information priority over the parliaments under the EWS, these are SP whose reasoned 
opinions are taken into account at a national level. Finally, in case of Germany, the most important 
factor obstructing SPM under the EWS is the dominating position of regional executives in federal 
governance arrangements. Highly technical character of policy negotiations conducted behind closed 
doors in the executive-dominated Bundesrat institutionalizes the legislative function of regional 
executives in domestic EU policy-making. Information priority of Länder governments and lack of 
direct vertical relation between federal and regional parliaments further impedes SPM.  
The domestic meso-level factors also influence the different subnational parliamentary strategies in 
the wider context of EU affairs. While the Spanish SP seek to improve intra-state communication 
channels, the UK devolved parliaments and stronger German Landtage seek rather external channels 
of control over EU policy.  
Taking into account the above, it could be stated that while both meso-level factors are important in 
explaining the patterns of SPM among the analysed states, the primary one is always the position of 
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regional executives in domestic governance arrangements. This factor better explains why the 
institutional ‘misfit’ towards parliamentary Europeanization is found to be the strongest in Germany 
and the weakest in Spain. In terms of the inter-level parliamentary relations, in Spain a direct link has 
been established between SP and the national parliament both with regard to (bottom-up) uploading of 
regional opinions and (top-down) information feeding from the EU. In the UK, uploading of 
parliamentary opinions is complemented with informal contacts between the devolved parliaments and 
the House of Commons clerks. In Germany, no direct link between the regional and federal level 
assemblies exist and all information if mediated through regional executives. There is little reason to 
expect that vertical parliamentary channel will be established between SP and the federal level since, 
as revealed in the questionnaires, it seems unnecessary for both the executive and legislative actors. 
Lack of federal level safeguards for parliamentary involvement might be explained by the reluctance 
of the federal government to complicate the already complex system of domestic EU decision-making 
process. Contrary to Spain and the UK, the institutional structures of German parliamentary 
involvement have to a large extent resisted the changes of Europeanization. As these country patterns 
might undergo further consolidation or evolution, the adaptation that occurs in Germany lies more in 
the internal parliamentary organisation and only very slowly extends to a change in legislative-
executive relations.  
It could perhaps be argued that the evidence presented in this paper is premature, as the process of 
Europeanization, especially in the case of institutions as conservative as legislatures, is long-lasting 
and incremental. Thus far, however, the dynamics observed in the three analyzed countries seem to 
confirm validity of the theoretical assumptions. Further comparative research in other Member States 
is needed to confront and develop the proposed theoretical framework. Moreover, the empirical 
analysis allows us to see the EWS in a new light, as an Europeanization mechanism which increases 
mutual interdependence between institutional actors in the “multilevel parliamentary field”, giving rise 
to more cooperative forms of governance. It might be expected, that with time and more institutional 
adjustments in place, more regional input will be channeled upwards to the Commission through 
parliamentary channels. This encourages developing more robust theories regarding the actual and 
potential impact of the EWS not only on subnational parliamentary mobilization but also on multi-
level parliamentary cooperation in the EU.  
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ANNEX 1 
Table 1: Subnational parliamentary mobilization under the Early Warning System. 
 
 
* The data regarding the presence of formal procedures for subsidiarity scrutiny at regional level includes all regional parliaments in a Member State and is 
based on official institutional documents (i.e. regional regulations).  
** In Spain and Germany, some parliaments would give only approximate answers regarding the number of subsidiarity analyses conducted under the EWS.  
 
 
 
 
Time period 
analyzed: 
(2011-2012) 
Number of 
regional 
parliaments  
Presence of formal 
procedures at   
regional level* 
 
The number of 
subsidiarity 
analyzes conducted 
under EWS** 
The number of 
reasoned opinions 
issued by the regional 
parliaments  
Number of cases when 
regional opinions were 
taken into account at 
national level 
Existence of direct inter-
parliamentary cooperation 
between national and 
regional level  
 
SPAIN   
 
17 15 
 
approx. 370               7                 7 yes - formalized 
UK      
 
3 2 40               5                 5  yes - informal 
GERMANY  
 
16 4 approx. 90               6              no data  no 
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